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  Ken-ichi Sasaki

Abstract
I look back at the history of modern aesthetics to grasp its
current situation and to propose its possibilities for the future.
The early modern period, during which aesthetics came into
being, was a great historical turning point for civilization. Our
contemporary period shares this character, and it is worthwhile
for us to consult its history in order to reflect on our
civilization. Aesthetics began with Baumgarten’s proposal,
which consisted in a triple subject: sensibility, beauty, and
art. His idea was accepted because it responded to the
fundamental problems of the period. Sensibility was the only
form of cognition of value in a re-formed world (Pascal). Art
existed in three forms: official, social, and solitary and
reflective. The first (San Pietro and Versailles) promoted art
to the rank of high culture, and it was the third form that
presented aesthetics as the philosophy of art. But in the early
modern period, aesthetics was first of all the philosophy of
beauty because beauty guaranteed the rationality and order of
the new world (Shaftesbury, Malebranche). Modern aesthetics,
however, was a philosophy of art under the general trends of
anthropocentrism. The pursuit of originality led to Duchamp’s
Fountain, after which there remains nothing new for art to do.
We now confront urgent problems, such as global warming
and conflict between different civilizations, etc., which suggest
the need for changing the way of managing the world. Under
this situation, I think aesthetics holds new and real possibilities
for the philosophy of beauty.
Key Words
aesthetics, autonomy, beauty, civilization, crisis, modernity,
our period, three forms of art

1. Introduction
My subject here is a reflection on the possibilities and
orientations of contemporary aesthetics, referring to the early
modern situation when this field was established as a
philosophical discipline. As these two periods share the
characteristic of being a great historical turning point for
civilization, I believe this program can be justified.
Looked at this way, aesthetics should show a face rather
different from the one we are used to. Aesthetics is often
considered to be an isolated field in philosophy. We can quote
two reasons for this. The first concerns the stance of the
study of classical texts. Although in later developed countries
in modern culture, such as Japan, historical study is still
dominant in aesthetics, aesthetics in Western countries is
inclined to speculation rather than to such studies. This is
something that is not found in other fields of philosophy.
Asking why this is so, we arrive at a second reason, namely
that discussion in aesthetics is almost exclusively concentrated
on the problems of art. Art requires an autonomous status,

and that is regarded as a sign of a civilized state of culture.
Therefore, discussions on art should necessarily be
autonomous. Philosophy of art is willing to enclose itself
within its own distinctive area separate from other cultural
ones, such as politics and ethics, and consequently it is
isolated from other fields of philosophy.
I wish to talk about a completely different aesthetics. In early
modern times when aesthetics was coming into existence, it
was far from being narrow and particular but was charged with
the real and urgent philosophical problem of its time: how to
construct a new world. Modern civilization, established
through such discussions, seems to be ending in our day. The
leading idea of “progress,” which consists in elevating the
amenities of life through the exploitation of nature, cannot
continue in that manner any more. The history of modern
aesthetics was coordinated with this cycle of civilization. As is
well known, the end of art has been proclaimed, just as it has
been said of history and of the modern. It goes without
saying that this does not concern the abolition of art, but if the
being of art changes radically, an aesthetics that developed as
a philosophy of art cannot but transform itself. And indeed,
aren’t there positive reasons that it should change?
In this paper I want to consider the role of the aesthetics in
terms of the contemporary situation of global civilization. The
season of the philosophy of art that flourished in the second
half of the twentieth century, an aesthetics based on the
paradigm of modern art, seems to be in an afterglow. The
discussion being exhausted, there are no new problems being
raised. As the prosperity of yesterday was triggered by the
avant-garde movement of art, it is unavoidable for aesthetics
to lose its vitality when art loses its way in a dead-end. The
movement of civilization has left the movement of art behind.
The history of aesthetics as a modern discipline coincided with
the development of modern Western civilization. Born with
the establishment of that civilization, shouldn't aesthetics
finish its role with the decline of this form of civilization? Or
does it have a positive role to play in this crisis we are facing,
as it did during an earlier turning point of civilization? This
paper will reflect on this problem.[1]
2. The Concept of Art and the Birth of Aesthetics
The German philosopher A. G. Baumgarten published the first
volume of his Aesthetica in 1750. This book, with a coinage of
the Latin word ’aesthetics’ as its title, meaning a science of
sensible cognition, took art and beauty as its main subject.
This claim gained important support, so much so that
Baumgarten succeeded in founding a new branch of
philosophy. We can say that it was his claim of a new field
rather than his theory itself that brought about its result, a
crystallization of the problem consciousness of many
philosophers and critics of that time.[2]
In this sense, aesthetics is a product of its time and a modern
discipline. This should be underlined. Some people pretend
that there are such classics as the aesthetics of Plato and
Aristotle. However, the general tendency of representing
aesthetics as a long tradition since ancient times lacks a sense
of its history. What is called ancient or medieval aesthetics
can actually be said to have come after Baumgarten. Previous

thoughts on beauty and art became worthy of attention only
with the establishment of aesthetics. When people wished to
consider beauty and art, it was useful and even indispensable
to consult the classics; it was natural to enlarge aesthetics
toward the past. But by uncritically following the schema of
continuity, we neglect the importance of the fact that the birth
of aesthetics occurred against a particular historical
background. The claim of Baumgarten found approval because
it was in response to the needs and requirements of the time.
His three motifs-- sensibility, beauty and art, constituted
actual problems at that time. We should begin with verifying
that.
The first element in this background to be examined is the
formation of the concept of art. It is a historical fact,
acknowledged by scholars, that the notion of art that we are
accustomed to, designating literature, music, and the visual
arts, took shape in Baumgarten’s lifetime.[3] It is relevant to
distinguish the notion of art from the phenomena of art. All
art, such as painting, sculpture, poetry, and music, produced
many masterpieces since ancient times and even in nonWestern regions. But they were not conceived as “art.” The
fact that Leonardo claimed the same status for painting as
poetry, because it was a cosa mentale, eloquently tells the
situation. Their levels of cultural dignity were regarded
differently. To say that the concept of art was established in
the mid-eighteenth century means that art, especially the
visual arts, had obtained social promotion through the struggle
of artists, including Leonardo. Let us look at the history of art
from this viewpoint. This does not concern what is generally
called art history but a kind of philosophical history of art that
focuses on what art was and traces its development. Of
course, it cannot but be brief.
From the end of the fifteenth through the end of the
eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, art
lived through three forms. They did not come one after
another; they co-exist even now. But we can distinguish an
earlier form from the later by their birth. The oldest was
public or official art, addressing itself to a large audience.
Civilization was changing, and political powers needed tangible
signs of their authentic existence. Examples are the Basilica of
San Pietro in Vatican City in religious art, and the cultural
policy of Louis the XIV in the secular. The Basilica of San
Pietro demonstrates the power at the center of the Catholic
church over the Protestant church, not only by its outer
appearance, constituted by Michelangelo’s dome and the
colonnade of Bellini, but also by its interior, featuring Rafael’s
paintings in two rooms and Michelangelo's great paintings
about the Creation in the Sistine Chapel.
On the other hand, in the case of Louis XIV, art contributed
more directly to enhancing the King’s prestige. In the middle
of the seventeenth century, France was politically and
culturally an underdeveloped country, as is shown by the fact
that it welcomed not only queens but also prime ministers
from foreign countries. The ambitious young king addressed
this weakness on both the military and cultural fronts. At the
same time as he successively pursued conquering wars against
surrounding countries, he considered the cultural politics
promoting art in France as indispensable. He wished to be

both feared and respected. (It would be interesting to
compare the policy of contemporary countries in this respect.)
Versailles was constructed, on whose background the tragedies
of Racine, comedies of Moliere, and operas of Lully were
presented. On the scene of ballet, called “ballet de cour,” the
King, himself, appeared; he was called “le Roi Soreil” because
he impersonated the Sun (Apollo) in the Ballet de Nuit (1635).
In this ballet, we notice the essence of baroque art in the
world of fantasy that is projected on the figure of the real King
to bestow on him a glorious gleam. Especially remarkable
were the generous pensions offered to European poets, who
would produce poems in praise of the king. It was not the act
of a Maecenas; rather than wanting to assist artists, those
with political power needed artistic beauty. So, as a buttress
to political power, art and artists rose in status. It was this
public art that contributed most to the formation of the
modern concept of art as high culture.
We have to acknowledge, however, that such public and
large-scale art is rather different from what we now conceive
as art. The representative forms of art that appeal to a large
audience are drama, opera, and ballet, which no longer have
the function of glorifying power anymore. For such purposes
we think of ceremonies such as military parades and the
opening events of the Olympic games, but few people would
acknowledge them as art, and even when admitted among the
arts, they remain marginal.[4] This means that in modern
times, the being of art has radically changed.
The second form of post-Renaissance art was social art, such
as Rococo art, intended for the enjoyment of a small
audience.[5] The form of space underwent a radical change.
The palace at Versailles constituted totally of public space, and
privacy did not exist, even for the king. All activities were
ceremonies that served to sustain the political regime.[6] The
Rococo, on the contrary, was a culture of private rooms,
especially those of aristocratic ladies. Conversation became an
art and interior decoration, as its setting, was highly sought
after. The basic form of music was background music.
However, the third and the most important form of art
appeared almost at the same time, that is, solitary and
reflexive or meditative art.[7] In relation to the number of
people involved, it may look like a variation of social art, but
its essence is radically different. A good example of the
evolution from the second to the third form of art is provided
by Mozart at Paris. This was a trip in search of a permanent
job. Mozart composed his Concerto for Flute and Harp, the
masterpiece of Rococo music, in the context of Parisian high
society. However, his Sonata for Piano in A Minor, composed
in the same year (1778), is a completely different form of
music. One cannot listen to it and pleasantly chat at the same
time; it obliges one to concentrate at a deeper level of the
mind. For that reason, this piece is often related to his painful
experience of losing his mother in this foreign land.
According to modern concepts, the main form of art is this
third one, a form of art that philosophy meditated on, and that
required aesthetics as the philosophy of art. The modern
notion of art, that takes this solitary and reflexive form as
essential, is well expressed in Hegel’s philosophy. In his

system, which regards world history as the progress of the
awakening of the Spirit, art, along with religion and
philosophy, is attributed to the absolute Spirit that constitutes
its final stage.
3. Sensibility and New Value
The concept that aesthetics has developed since it became the
philosophy of art is undeniable. But we should not forget that
Baumgarten’s aesthetics had not only art but also sensibility
and beauty as its subjects. These two subjects can be
regarded as more important for a philosophy that answers to
the problem raised by civilization. As we share this concern
with regard to our contemporary situation, we find an essential
interest in these subjects.
Let us begin with sensibility. Baumgarten’s idea of aesthetics
as the philosophy of sensibility was inspired by Leibniz’
epistemology. Among the various modes of cognition classified
by Leibniz, it is the category of clear and confused cognitions
that are empirically identified but linguistically indeterminable
that corresponds to Baumgartenian aesthetics. Leibniz
includes both the perception of sensible qualities, such as red
and sweet, and value judgments on poetry and painting in this
category.[8] When judging the quality of a painting, we
examine its subject, composition, coloring, and touch, and
then evaluate it synthetically through our feeling. Red, on the
contrary, does not allow such an analysis. So a difference
between being synthetic and elemental, and, therefore, the
value of a painting, and a sensible quality, such as red, seems
to be heterogeneous to one another. But it is possible to
recognize a synthetic character in sensible quality; in reference
to the famous theory of small perception, that is, we are
unable to discern the sound of every drop of water, but we
perceive their totality as the sound of a wave. Anyway,
several analyses are possible and effectuated by art critics
concerning the quality of an art work, but its beauty is not a
synthesis of such analyses but can only be grasped
aesthetically, that is, through feeling, at once. Leibniz applies
the concept of “je-ne-sais-quoi” to this character, derived
from Petrarch and widely used in the seventeenth century,
mainly in France.[9] This is the first object and field of
Baumgarten’s aesthetics.
To understand the originality of the idea of aesthetics, we can
compare the “clear and confused” cognition to the “clear and
distinct,” which was considered as the authentic object of
science. It was just the character Descartes checked at every
step of his argument. As mentioned above, according to
Leibniz’ definition, it concerns the cognition that we can
linguistically analyze and determine. We know that the
Cartesian method consists in analysis and synthesis.
Baumgarten’s claim of aesthetics implies the intuition that
there are cognitions beyond the reach of analysis and
synthesis, and that they are important. Pascal had stated the
importance of sensible cognition a century before
Baumgarten. “We know truth, not only by the reason, but also
by the heart, and it is in this last way that we know first
principles; and reason, which has no part in it, tries in vain to
impugn them…The principle is felt, and propositions are
deduced.”[10] This word itself can be understood in terms of

the difference between the axioms of geometry and its
theorems or particular proofs. But I believe that what he
wished to talk about in guise of geometry was the existence of
God. The existence of God, having fallen under skeptical
suspicion, cannot be recovered by reasoning, as was tried by
Descartes, but has to be grasped through feeling. Where
reasoning is futile, what is required is existential consent,
which is the business of sensibility. This means that sensibility
is a matter of values as existential choice and involvement
rather than sensible qualities.
The claim of such a form of cognition was a demand raised at
the time of the great change of civilization. The working social
system had become dysfunctional and its discourses were felt
to be lies. This was particularly true with the Christianity that
preoccupied Pascal. If people lose confidence in the authority
of the Pope as the representative of God and his church, they
have no other means than to contact God directly, and to
contact God directly is nothing but to feel his presence. The
Pascalian thesis of the God-to-be-felt coincides perfectly with
the claim of the Protestants.
Aesthetic (sensible) value was claimed in the secular world
too. The fashion of the courtier’s manual at the sixteenth to
seventeenth centuries took place against the background of
court society, which enjoyed stability on the basis of class and
birth, but was becoming so fluid that it became possible for
courtiers to gain promotion by their business ability and
personal bewitching power. Castiglione (1528), the most
representative author in this genre, insisted on “sprezzatura,”
that is, a refined behavior that consists in studied naturalness,
pretending not to have the wide and profound culture that was
kept hidden.[11] Such a charm cannot but be felt; it concerns
personal value tout court, beyond traditional objective
standards such as class and birth, and we have no other
choice than this kind of personal power of presence and
charm. The emphasis laid on culture coincides with the
cultural policy of Louis XIV. People recognized a universal
value in culture that transcends the historical change of
civilization. It is worth remarking that this secularized, that is,
human, value was confined to aesthetic (sensible) verification.
4. Beauty of the World—Response to Hobbes
The great turning point of early modern times might have
been seen as a good sign for most people in a small society,
such as the court of Urbino, to which Castiglione belonged.
But for the world as a whole it was literally a crisis, shaking
the very principles of civilization and causing a deep anxiety.
Beauty was an answer to this critical situation. Let us turn
first to the philosophy of Hobbes, who grasped this anxiety.
The basis of his political philosophy is human equality in the
natural state. It is remarkable that instead of setting out from
the political systems that existed, he was willing to make a
fresh start and reflect upon human society without any
presupposition. We find in this attitude something similar to
the standpoint of aesthetics we have sketched above. Both
can be considered philosophical attempts to design a future at
a great turning point in history.
What Hobbes deduced from that primitive equality of people is
expressed by his famous thesis, “Bellum omnium contra

omnes.” This notion struck a chord with his contemporaries.
The reason for this perpetual struggle is that the competition,
distrust, and pride found in human behavior cause conflict.
This is not a historical description but a general theory showing
the fundamental tendency of human beings to fall into a
perpetual struggle. Against this possibility, Hobbes proposed
the view that human beings agree to collaborate one with
another out of horror, and form a society by means of a
contract.[12] Called the theory of social contract, this
occupies an important position in the history of political
theory, so that, as taken over by Locke and J.-J. Rousseau, it
has come to constitute the basis of modern social philosophy.
In arguing for a contract, Hobbes believed that a strong power
was indispensable for overcoming the struggle. From the
standpoint of theory or logic, this can be regarded as an
inconsistency or a paradox and judged as immature, compared
with Locke and Rousseau. But it is more realistic to consider
it as the result of Hobbes’ strong sense of menace that
struggle posed for society. In fact, he lived through a time of
civil war at the beginning of the first civil revolution. “Bellum
omnium contra omnes” was not a theoretical hypothesis but a
real possibility after the trembling and collapse of the old
regime. What is reflected by this thesis is the anxiety of a
people who were obliged by a crisis to invent afresh a new
civilization. The urgent necessity was to overcome this
anxiety, and modernity started with this solution.
I believe that the philosophy of beauty was a response to the
Hobbesian crisis, but before explaining why, I wish to mention
another response. While the social philosophy mentioned
above tried to present a solution in a straightforward way,
optimism appeared for the possibility of overcoming the crisis
through new social activities, that is, a philosophy of
commerce or economic activity. In 1734, Voltaire reported on
a new institution in London, the stock market, and mentioned
that it was a “peaceful and free assembly” where “the Jews,
the Mahometans, and the Christians transact together as tho’
they profess’d the same religion.”[13] Such philosophical
speculation on economical activities was crystallized into
theory in the Wealth of Nations (1776) by Adam Smith.
Relating this economic theory to his Moral Sentiments (1759),
we find that it was an answer to the Hobbesian crisis. One of
the key concepts of this period was “interest,” which underlay
the Hobbesian struggle. Smith believed that when individuals
pursued their interests, an “invisible hand” harmonized their
activities with the interests of the total society.[14] Economic
activity became a leading power in modern society, so much
so that it encroached even on art and exercised a menacing
influence on civilization.
The philosophy of beauty appeared in this critical context. I
have in mind the views of Shaftesbury. Wishing to controvert
Hobbes’ pessimistic human view, he presented the beauty of
the world as evidence of its rationality, and then, by an
analogy with such beauty, argued that man is virtuous by
nature.[15] His argument contains two steps. The first step
also concerns the desire of self-preservation, which Hobbes
considered the basic motive of struggle. Shaftesbury replaced
this with the concept of self-love that, in relation to interest,
played a crucial role in the secularization of the world view.
Self-love, which had been negated in the Christian context on

behalf of the love of God, became accepted from the
naturalistic viewpoint and led to opening the way to the
mundane and hedonistic culture represented by the rococo.
Malebranche’s and Rousseau’s arguments defending self-love
are well known.[16] What is distinctive in Shaftesbury’s
theory is that he aims to justify it from the viewpoint of the
total economy of the world. Sexual desire, a type of self-love,
is indispensable for the conservation of species. The economic
organization of the world can thus be verified by the organic
system of plants and animals, but that is not all. Taking note
of what we would nowadays call the food chain, Shaftesbury
affirmed the fundamental goodness of the world by indicating
that what is good for one can be bad for another. And so he
relativized the good or evil of particular beings, insisting on the
rationality of the totality. This argument is of the same type
as Leibniz’ theodicy.
Shaftesbury’s argument was not finished with that; he had to
prove that the world is not only economical and rational but
also good. Hence, the second step. The point here is that the
economy of the world is perceived as beauty. The perception
of beauty is important because its judgment is not influenced
by any personal prejudice or arbitrariness; that is, it is
disinterested. Disinterestedness, which would become the
core factor of aesthetics after Kant, here means being
exempted from personal interest. Shaftesbury claimed that
the same is true with human behavior. This connects with his
“moral sense,” which testifies to our instinct for virtue. Men
do not necessarily struggle with one another to further their
selfish desires. It is in our nature to perform virtuous acts
despite such desires. Even if the ancient order collapses,
human society will continue. Such was the opinion of
Shaftesbury, for whom beauty was an essential element. Here
we find the philosophical meaning that beauty had in the early
modern era.
From such a perspective, Malebranche’s theory of creation
shows an unexpected aspect. Here beauty is philosophically
important, too. The puzzling problem of why evil exists in a
world created by God was resolved on the basis of Leibnizian
optimism. But the Christian philosophy of Malebranche faced
a problem even more puzzling and fundamental: why a perfect
being, lacking nothing, should create a world at all.
Apparently, this concerns only the Christian doctrine, but in
the ideological context of that time, it could be a most acute
problem, and his answer to this question reveals the actuality
it had. Vis-à-vis this difficulty of discovering a motive without
motive, Malebranche referred to the work of an architect.[17]
Unlike the medieval God as architect, his architect was not a
technician measuring with a ruler and a compass but one
blessed with a modern sense of existence, demanding a
meaning in his own work. He constructs because he finds the
incentive in his pride in the beauty of his work. He does not
act for any purpose. To adopt a modern expression, it is a
gratuitous act. Divine Creation is the same. It is necessary
that God loves himself. Because of this essence, God creates
the beautiful world and takes this beauty for his glory. The
goodness or value of the world is proven by its beauty, and
the art work was based on that model.

5. Autonomy of Art and Its Aesthetics
We have thus sketched the foundations of aesthetics, the new
discipline taking sensibility, beauty, and art as its distinctive
subjects. We have done this in view of finding a key to the
philosophical problems our times impose, because these
periods share the situation of being in a crisis of civilization.
However, this early modern aesthetics is very different from
the modern aesthetics established in the early nineteenth
century and continuing still. The aesthetics discussed above
concerned the position or role of beauty and art in the world,
and not a theory analyzing their phenomena. In order for a
philosophical field to establish itself as a new discipline, it
needs to prove its meaning in the whole world. Once
approved, however, the field becomes autonomous and needs
theories about the concrete phenomena it covers. What
concerns us here is such a transformation of aesthetics.
Modern aesthetics is the philosophy of art, with the model of
art taken from the third form of art in the history of art
described above, solitary and meditative art. We are deeply
permeated by the notion that such art is the true art. As a
result, we are now reluctant to take the opening ceremonies of
the Olympic games and military parades as art, even though
they can be regarded as public arts appealing to a large
audience that indeed were the most important “arts” at the
formative period of the concept of art described above.
With modern aesthetics and the reflective arts established,
with beauty as their object, the position of beauty has
essentially changed. Indeed, the concept of beauty as the
essence of art is largely accepted as a cliché, so much so that
a museum of junk art or urinals is called a “temple of
beauty.” But it is obvious that beauty is now out of date in
the philosophy of art. In fact, such a change began at the
very moment modern aesthetics was founded. As the index of
this change, we can cite the birth of the author. A half century
ago, people enthusiastically discussed the death of the author.
Apart from the curious fact that at that time the author still
seemed to be alive, people talked as though the author had
existed in a very distant past. “The author,” however, is a
notion that came into being between the end of the eighteenth
and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries.[18] Of course
there had existed those who produced works of literature. But
the practice of focusing the appreciative experience of art work
on the existence and the thoughts or world view of the author,
and taking the work as his or her creation, is modern. We can
trace this change of viewpoint to the criticism of Shakespeare.
The classical view of the ideal of artistic beauty consists, as
Pascal claimed of eloquence,[19] in the art beyond art. We
find in Shakespeare, by Samuel Johnson (1765), a beautiful
expression that can be regarded as the final radiance of the
old aesthetics. Referring to Voltaire, who opposed
Shakespeare to Addison, Johnson wrote that Addison speaks
the language of a poet, Shakespeare that of human beings. In
other words, while we think of the author in the works of
Addison, in Shakespeare we confront dramatic persons full of
character, so that we forget the presence of the author. The
genius of a poet consists in the power of creating such realities
and of making us forget the author. Forty years later, Schiller
reconsidered this fact not as the difference of creative power

but of types of work.[20] What he calls “naïve” is the
literature of Shakespeare the genius, where the author is
hidden behind the work. “Sentimental” literature, on the
contrary, is the type where the mind and thoughts of the
author come into account. As Schiller, himself, confessed, he
had firmly learned the attitude of looking for the author in a
literary work and, reflecting with him or her, sentimental
literature is the modern type. As the work of art beyond the
author transcends individuality and is characterized by selfsufficiency (ens per se), its value is shown by its beauty as the
mark of its perfection. On the contrary, sentimental literature
of the modern type is the literature of ideas. The sign of its
value is not beauty anymore but consists in the individual
spirit of the author and his thought. It is evident that this
coincides with the solitary work of art.
It is obvious that modern aesthetics based on such a thought
is essentially different from that of Baumgarten. People of the
eighteenth century, including Leibniz and Baumgarten,
believed that the essence of art consists in beauty that is
aesthetically perceived. But now the mark of value slides from
beauty to depth and originality, and the spiritual or intellectual
value transcends the realm of sensibility. Art acknowledged as
high culture becomes an autonomous activity, and we find its
modern history driven by the pursuit of novelty, as the
expression of the individuality of the artist. Such an
autonomous art, insisting on originality, culminates in
Duchamp’s Fountain, which reveals the paradox of art as an
autonomous institution. We find in the origin of this work a
critique or an irony of the autonomous position. Duchamp
wished to imply a radical question by exhibiting the urinal so
that, if an exhibition space or museum makes the exhibited
object an art work, then why not this one? Without being
displayed at the exhibition of the New York Independents,
Fountain is now considered the most important artwork of the
twentieth century.[21] It criticized the autonomous institution
of art, yet was acknowledged as art because of that
institution. It illustrates even now the narrow path into which
art and the philosophy of art have been led. Why art took the
course in this direction concerns not only art and aesthetics
but the orientation of the modern civilization in general.
6. Homo-centrism of Modern Aesthetics
The beautiful art of the past was based on the principle of
imitation of nature and referred to nature and human history.
But art became more and more interested in referring to
itself. That is the “autonomization,” which was accomplished
in the early twentieth century. I would like to check some
steps leading up to this. In the first place, we find the fact of
the decline of nature. The Western world, being originally
founded on the basis of urban culture, had little genuine
interest in nature. However, with the development of tourism
in the eighteenth century, people progressively opened their
eyes to the beauty of nature, leading to an aesthetics of the
sublime. In Shaftesbury’s theory mentioned above, the beauty
in question must be of nature. Diderot became a philosopher
through a deep reading of Shaftesbury. Gifted with artistic
talent, he had a profound interest in art. In his Salons, we
perceive that the paintings he regarded as masterpieces were
those that give us the experience of forgetting that they were

paintings and letting us enter into the painted world. Painting
was a device of quasi-real experience in which a communion
with people is realized. The aesthetics of Kant, in his Critique
of Judgment, is essentially an aesthetics of nature. But with
Hegelian aesthetics as the index, it is evident that modern
aesthetics concentrated into one of artistic beauty, neglecting
natural beauty.
Nowadays, no one in the Western world understands aesthetics
to mean anything different from the philosophy of art. With
the shift of subject from natural beauty to the artistic, the
focus of aesthetics moved from substance to image.
Imagination, that is, dreaming the absent, was discussed
throughout the nineteenth century. Its original position can be
perceived in the notion of avant-garde (a military metaphor),
which stemmed from the circle of Saint-Simon, who believed
in the leadership of artists in the creation of a new world.[22]
Of course, such a casting was “fantastic”: “autonomization” is
not consistent with the ability to effect social reform.
The aesthetics of the nineteenth century, which emphasized
image and imagination, embodies modern homo-centrism. We
can verify this particularly in the aesthetics of the sublime.
The sublime is what exceeds the human pale, in both forms
that Kant distinguished: “dynamic” and “mathematical.” In
his famous phrase, “Two things fill the mind with ever new
and increasing admiration and reverence, the more often and
the more steadily one reflects on them: the starry heavens
above me and the moral law within me,”[23] the heavens are
typically sublime. However, when theorizing about it in the
Critique of Judgment, Kant finds greatness in the human
spirit. In fact, he asserts that it is not nature but rather the
power of reason comprehending indefinite magnitude or power
that is really sublime.[24]
Like Shaftesbury, Kant conceived a profound reverence for
cosmic beauty empirically. Philosophically, however, he
directed this reverence to the subject. Therefore, the world
view he expressed was very different from Shaftesbury’s. The
sublime, in fact, was originally artistic. The notion derives
from the rhetoric of Pseudo-Longinus, and Boileau, who
transmitted it to the modern world, conceived of it as a
linguistic phenomenon.[25] Edmund Burke, who understood it
in philosophical terms and claimed that the sublime was
familiar to poetry, found in the comparison of poetry and
painting a parallel in the relation of the sublime and
beauty.[26] In spite of all these, we should not forget that
Pseudo-Longinus associated it to an art beyond art.[27] That
is to say, from its origin the sublime was an effect
transcending linguistic determinations. We have another,
more important fact: Burke showed in his description of the
sublime a rich sensibility about raw and wild nature, which
constituted the core of his theory of the sublime.[28]
Founding the sublime on human reason, Kant even impressed
the seal of homo-centrism onto the aesthetics of the sublime.
The revival of the notion of the sublime around the end of the
twentieth century surprised us. We, or at least I, had believed
that modern Western civilization had lost any sense of the
infinite, and that, consequently, the sublime had been lost as
an aesthetic category. Let us consider the case of Adorno,

who clearly followed Kant in his conception of the sublime.
Adorno believed that with the collapse of formal beauty, the
only traditional aesthetic category left was the sublime,
though the sensible sublime is almost ridiculous. The modern
non-sensible sublime is the self-negating movement imprinted
deeply in art, distinguishing it from craft. We can call it
sublime because the sublime, as defined by Kant, consists in
the mind’s resistance to overwhelming power.[29] It is a
phenomenon representing the Adornian Enlightenment.
But I wonder whether we can call “sublime” a sublime that is
neither perceived nor felt, or at least ask whether such a
sublime is an aesthetic category. Indeed, Adorno and his
followers might “feel” the sublime in the avant-garde, but only
on the basis of a highly culture-specific association of ideas.
Such a culture-burdened phenomenon reminds me of Jean
Giraudoux, who wrote, “I’ve enough of Asian women: the
more they undress, there appears the dress of the naked more
decorating than any dress” (The Trojan War Will Never Take
Place). The ornament decorating the naked body is nothing
but ideas. The autonomy of art and artistic “beauty,” which
founds modern Western aesthetics, is constituted by such a
network of ideas, and can never mean that a pure aesthetic
appearance is exempted from social constraint. Because of
such a concentration on ideas, avant-garde represents modern
art.
I have a reservation. Adorno said that the sensible sublime is
ridiculous. We understand this. It is ridiculous because in it
we perceive a gesture of human conceit. What is ridiculous is
not the artistic expression of the sublime but the self-cognition
of human beings and their satisfaction with the culture they
have produced. How, then, is it possible for the Adornian
sublime to escape being ridiculous? The spirit of
enlightenment that consists in a radical self-criticism proves
that modern Western civilization is worthy of respect. But as
soon as he calls it “sublime,” doesn’t he betray its spirit? As a
philosopher, Adorno is exceptional in the history of aesthetics
for his insistence on natural beauty, which had been
completely neglected. The paradox here is all the more deeprooted; it is the paradox of modern civilization. The modern
was rose-colored when Descartes looked forward to it from a
distance, claiming that by developing his philosophy, man
could become “the owner and master of nature.” Modern
civilization, continuously endeavoring to conquer nature, is
now threatening the existence of human beings. Modern
aesthetics is not alien to this paradox.
7. Art as Discourse
The avant-garde sublime is represented by Duchamp’s
Fountain. For a long time, being an artifact was the most
fundamental precondition of being an art work. The Fountain
almost totally lacks this condition, as Duchamp intended;
instead of making an artifact, he wished to execute an
ideological act on the subject of art. Duchamp, the Dadaist,
focused his criticism on the self-evident presupposition of art
and art’s integration into the system of high culture. The
artistic system is constituted by educational organizations,
such as academies, the exhibitions recognizing art works, and
the museums sanctifying them, and an authoritative standing

is acknowledged in the professionals working in these
institutions. The judgment on whether an object is art, and
what artistic value is to be attributed to it, is put in the hands
of these professionals; an amateur’s opposition has no
meaning because art has already been made autonomous.
Let us compare this situation with that of early modern times
when the concept of art was forming. It was the laic powers
that played the decisive role in bestowing the status of high
culture to art. The difference between this state of art and
that at the beginning of the twentieth century is evident, and
the whole history of modern art is included in this gap.
Duchamp targeted this situation of art. Compared with the
Saint-Simonian ideal of the avant-garde aiming at social
reform, Duchamp’s act was limited to art; its reach was even
shorter than the philosophical avant-garde of such as Adorno.
But its impact on the concept of art, and its influence on art
afterwards, were immense. I quote an art work that looks like
a parody of Duchamp. On the one hand, we have a figure
made by a Japanese artist; it is an artwork. On the other
hand, we also have a figure taking the shape of the same
model as the former, but fabricated by a toy company; this is
a toy. Naturally, while the latter is cheap, the former is very
expensive. At the level of substance, there seems to be
nothing that differentiates them. The Fountain as substance is
nothing but a urinal among others that are sold by any
plumber; it is neither finely executed nor particularly
beautiful. Every standard of value expected from traditional
art works does not apply to it. It naturally raises an objection
or protest as to whether it is art. With disregard to its
emotional element, this criticism can be reduced to a
philosophical question: What is art? This question, raised
again and again in the second half of the twentieth century,
was thrust upon us by the historical reality of art. Indeed, it is
a difficult question, since we can find no common point
between the Medici Venus and the Fountain. Seemingly the
most probable is to appeal to “family resemblance,”[30] but
what among acknowledged art works resembles the Fountain?
Nothing. It is no longer possible to define art by its
physiognomy.
On this subject, the solution proposed by Arthur Danto on the
subject of Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box is well known. Indeed, this
art object is physiognomically indiscernible from the real
container used by the Brillo Company. Danto found a real
philosophical problem there. Quoting the Cartesian doubt as
to whether the figure on the street of which a hat and a black
coat are seen from the window of the upper floor is a man or
a robot, or the ethical difference Kant made between the
authentic moral act and the one that just looks like one, he
claimed that it was a philosophical task to distinguish those
that cannot be distinguished based on their appearance. The
conclusion he deduced from that was that art is what the art
world acknowledges, on the basis of its proper history, as
art.[31] This definition is apparently empty and evidently
tautological; it reflects the structure of a tautological world.
An autonomous world is essentially tautological. This is not
only the structure of art, but also of our contemporary, highly
information-oriented society itself. It may be what Baudrillard
caught with his notion of “simulation.” Our society is

constituted by a system of signs, having no reference to
substances, and not based upon them. Paper money is not
convertible any more, and its value is founded solely on credit
and expectation. The price of commodities does not represent
their value in use, and salaries no longer reflect the value of
the productivity of labor. The point made by Baudrillard that
an indefinite claim for wages could then be possible is
suggestive in reference to the price of art works.[32]
Baudrillard mentions Pop Art in connection with simulation,
and, indeed, Warhol’s Brillo Boxes and Lichtenstein’s enlarged
cartoons are signs of signs. While the original cartoon costs
only a few dollars per copy, a painting or even a print of
Lichtenstein is incomparably expensive. This value is not
based upon the substantial quality of the work, such as that
supported by the original spirituality and the exceptional
technique brought to it, like in the case of a Dürer or a
Rembrandt. Rather, it derives from the special commodity of
having the selling point of being art. When I talk about
contemporary art work, I mention its price several times, for
that, even if not the only one, is at least one of the most
important elements since Duchamp. And to repeat, the
categorization into art is performed by a tautological
discourse.
It is evident that such art is not to be aesthetically
experienced. Its essence consists in crystallizing the mode of
being of contemporary society. In that sense, we can
acknowledge that its interest is philosophical. This means that
it incites philosophical speculation, but not that it is
philosophical by itself. Watching Pop Art being welcomed as
avant-garde, Duchamp vehemently criticized it in a letter to
his old friend Hans Richter.[33] The strong critical spirit of the
Dadaist Duchamp was indeed not found in Pop Art. It is
“philosophical” not because it embodies a critical vision of
society but because it exemplifies the best social structure of
our day. Being itself a part of the mechanism of society, such
art becomes a kind of fashion, and naturally loses any critical
power. It is beyond question that art works could be produced
without interruption, authorized by the art world, just like the
Federal Bank of America continues to print unconvertible dollar
notes. Only it would be an art different from the one based on
the idea of spirituality (Geistigkeit).
Hence, the well-known discussion of the end of art. It is
important to recognize that the current state of art is the
result of its historical development. Moreover, now art seems
to be deeply implicated in the cultural phenomena of politics,
economics, morality, and the like, so that its problems can
only be discussed on the total horizon of civilization. Viewing
the horizon fully, we notice that the modern idea of the
conquest of nature has caused the serious result of global
warming. We should reflect whether a similar decadence is
ongoing in the spirit. I mentioned above Baudrillard’s point
that a claim of indefinite wages could be proposed. The bubble
economy made us shallow. Now the direction is inverted,
albeit the real conditions remain the same. What is
happening, at least in Japan, is the indefinite reduction of
wages. Under the rule of dynamics aiming solely at the
reproduction of the social system, a bipolarization between the
frivolous rich and poor people is ongoing, producing decay of
morals.

8. The Philosophy of Beauty as Contemporary
Aesthetics
Humankind now needs philosophy above all. Without doubt,
globalization has brought about an economic situation based
on the law of the jungle; what the philosophers of
enlightenment would have called barbarism. This wave of
change, while producing such excellent results as political
liberation and the sharing of information, has also spread a
global disease: the uncritical adoption of economic centrism.
We are being tamed to accept the notion that financial value is
the only value; that freedom of economic venture, requiring
the autonomous reproduction of the system, is the only
freedom. As a result, we cannot effectively cope with the
problem of global warming, which is threatening the very
ground of our existence, or with the problem of moral
decadence. Everyone endowed with the power of judgment
understands that it is an urgent problem. Although
acknowledging this fact, we can devise no efficient measures.
This modern system is indeed our Leviathan. Though our age
resembles the early modern period in being a crisis of
civilization, the nature of the crisis is very different. At the
time of Hobbes, the problem consisted in philosophically
knowing the rationality of the world and the grounds of
morality. That was the problem preoccupied by Hobbes,
himself, Shaftesbury, Smith, and other philosophers. As
mentioned above, beauty played an important role in that
knowing. However, the monster that is our contemporary
social system is immune to the moral good will of individuals.
We require a philosophy to analyze the monster, and to
discover what form of civilization is really desirable.
Can aesthetics contribute anything to this philosophical task?
I believe that beauty and the philosophy of beauty have a real
place. What we learned from early modern aesthetics is that
when basic values become suspect, or even invalid, aesthetic
judgment is the only path towards the establishment of new
values. Malebranche looked for the perfection of the world in
its beauty, and we find in Genesis a similar notion. Having
created the world during six days, at the rest time he took at
the seventh day, God appreciates his creation: “And God saw
every thing that he had made, and, behold, it was very good.”
The goodness that is perceived is nothing but beauty.[34]
From the viewpoint of aesthetics, this phrase means two
things. In the first place, God being the Almighty, the
goodness of his creation must be evident beforehand. Despite
that, he verified the quality of Creation. This fact expresses
the aesthetic nature of beauty, such as Kant tried to grasp
with the notion of reflective judgment. Beauty cannot be
determined a priori with concepts; it needs always to be
verified a posteriori. In other words, beauty is not made but
given. Human beings make the best effort to make their work
beautiful, appealing to all experiences and having a good
command of the power of intuition. Its beauty, however,
cannot but be found in the work, as it was in the case of God.
One might say that the case is the same with the invention of
a machine. Indeed, verification is indispensable. But its
purpose is just to ascertain there were no errors in its design
and making, and its result is known in advance. The beauty of
a work, on the contrary, is not discovered until it is given.

Beauty is always a gift, which surprises the author. Reflecting
on that profoundly, we can be cured of arrogance through
beauty. As beauty is a grace or gift, and its sole value
exceeds human power, we can expect it to play a role in
overcoming modern homo-centrism. The experience of beauty
has an actual importance in the world we are living in, and
beautiful art might regain its right of being. We should
acknowledge not only its appreciative but also its executive
experience in order to realize that beauty is a gift. A
philosophy of beauty should be active to emphasize this
cognition. This is the difference from the pedagogical effect of
beauty proclaimed by Schiller in the early modern era.
Now let us return to the phrase of the Genesis. It must
arouse a naïve question: why the Creator, the most perfect
being, had to verify the goodness of his creation in its beauty?
To reflect on this problem, it is indispensable to know that
beauty is the only means to recognize, without any
precondition, the goodness of the world. Since we are not
taking into account any orthodox theology, I may probably
dare to consider that the concept of goodness or value was
born only with the beauty of the world, and, at the same time,
the Creator became the best being possible. At the moment of
Creation, he was just the Creator, that is, the being of power.
Creating the beautiful world, God as the power became a good
being as well. Presupposing a priori such a quality as essence
is a common way of metaphysics… Of course, this
understanding, based upon the human pale, is meaningless for
the Jewish and Christian theologies, which have thousands of
years of history.
“Recognize the goodness of the world in its beauty” was the
claim of the early modern aesthetics. With conditions of
civilization being reduced to tabla rasa, people had to
construct a new good world from zero. Philosophers believed
that under such a situation, they had no other means than
beauty to recognize the goodness of the new world. If our
time is one of renovation, equivalent to the early modern
times, the goodness of our new world should be recognized by
beauty. As mere human beings, we have to adjust the plan
according to the beauty of the result. Of course, it is
important is to create a beautiful world to live in, rather than a
beautiful work for appreciation.
From this viewpoint, an exemplary meaning should be
accorded to the beauty of the cityscape. Since the
contemporary crisis of civilization comes from the depletion of
the natural resources, global warming, and the conflicts
between the different cultures, our first task should be found
in constructing one good world with people’s cooperation. The
contemporary situation is fundamentally different from that of
the modern era, which insisted on the creativity of the
individual genius, so as to rival God. Concerning the
cityscape, the modern example is found in the so-called
Cartesian city, which shows a unified form based on an
individual design. Our city design, on the contrary, cannot but
be based on a form that is gradually formed through tastes
and choices by many anonymous people and constantly
rewritten by new inhabitants. Therefore, it is indispensable
that in the perpetual process of forming, people learn to avoid
pretending one’s taste, and to accord the priority to the

beauty of wholeness in accordance with others. Cityscape is
the school of the spirit of cooperation. It is because of that,
that we can claim for it the meaning of the microcosm of the
contemporary civilization, and that the shift from art to
cityscape should take place.
Taking the beauty of the cityscape from this point of view, we
find a new aspect of beauty in contemporary culture, for we
encounter superficial beauty, which has no path to the
goodness of the substance, as Shaftesbury believed. The use
of paint is a good example. The old cities, fabricated with
marble, bricks, or wood, gained their beauty from these
substances. Hence, the cityscape offered a material unity,
because, according to the geographical conditions, all buildings
were constructed in wood in a city in the region rich in woods,
or in marble in a district blessed with these resources. The
distribution of materials having become highly convenient, this
material restriction has long disappeared. People can use the
materials they like and construct buildings in their favorite
style. Paint gives it the last finish. Those who like gold color
build their houses in gold, and who adore pink, a pink house.
In other times, materials such as gold foil and lapis lazuli were
so expensive that the exterior decorated with them were
exceptional, like the Kinkaku-ji temple in Kyoto. Now colors
are cheap, so we have free use of the full spectrum of colors.
As a result, towns show the aspect of clamor with different and
strong self-assertion. This sight is an epitome of the
contemporary society.[35] In such a cityscape, the spirit of
harmonizing one’s own voice to the surroundings is all the
more precious.
There must be people who pretend that the spectacle of an
overturned toy box is beautiful. The relativity of taste, which
troubled aestheticians of early modern times, becomes
tangible, this time not as a merely epistemological problem,
but as that of actual social forming. “Taste” is liking, and it is
impossible to unify people’s diverse likings. But when the
conflict between tastes is revealed, and arouses a dispute, we
should be led to look into the sense of moral or value backing
each taste. This exists even in superficial beauty. Albeit this
is one of the most important problems for the philosophy of
beauty, it has remained unnoticed. This fact now attracts our
attention in relation to our experience. For example, great
landslips of icebergs and snow valleys are reported as
evidence of global warming, and their photos and videos
published. Watching such a phenomenon on the spot, we
must aesthetically feel the sublime. With the cognition,
however, that it concerns not a purely natural phenomenon
but a crisis produced by human beings, it should stop being
sublime. We can even say that we must not feel the sublime
in it. Through television we experienced the thrill of watching
the tracks of missiles against the night sky. As a feeling, we
cannot but find it beautiful. But this beauty claims that we
consider what is on its backside.
We have thus arrived at the contemporary situation of beauty,
full of contradictions. On the one hand, beauty remains the
sign of value, just like in the cases of the Genesis,
Malebranche, Shaftesbury and Kant. And at the period of
radical change of civilization, it should always be the only
measure of the new value. On the other hand, however, when

it is produced by human beings, beauty has a backside, which
denies the power of such aesthetic evidence. The
contradiction here is nothing but the tension belonging to the
contemporary civilization, which should be the starting point
from which a philosophy of beauty should develop to the
actual axiology.
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